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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3)(j). This appeal is subject to reassignment to the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).
ISSUES PRESENTED
Plaintiff/Appellant William R. Rothstein purchased a season ski pass to
Snowbird Ski Resort, which operates on public land. Salt Lake County ski resorts,
including Defendant/Appellee Snowbird Corporation, require purchasers of season
ski passes to sign a Release and Indemnity Agreement releasing the resorts for
negligence which results in the injury to a patron. In order to obtain a seasons
pass known as a Seven Summits Pass at Snowbird for the 2002-2003 season,
Rothstein was required to sign two such Releases.1 On February 3, 2003,
Rothstein sustained serious, life-threatening injuries (12 broken ribs, a decimated
right kidney, bruised heart, damaged liver and collapsed lung) when he skied into
a massive manmade retaining wall (constructed of mine timber cribbing) that had
been erected on one of Snowbird's ski runs. That retaining wall was snow
covered and not marked.

1

The first Release was to obtain a Snowbird season pass. The second Release
was required to obtain the Seven Summits Pass that gave Rothstein additional
skiing privileges such as not waiting in the lift lines. (R. at 175-76.)

1

Based upon the Releases that Rothstein had signed, the Honorable Anthony
Quinn granted summary judgment in favor of Snowbird on Rothstein's
negligence-based claims. The issues which Rothstein wishes to address on appeal
are: Whether such Releases are enforceable or otherwise void and against public
policy (1) as a result of Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 7827-52, et seq, or (2) on the basis of being adhesion contracts?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To determine whether the District Court properly granted summary
judgment, this Court "review[s] the trial court's order granting summary judgment
for correctness and accord[s] no difference to the court's legal conclusions. In
addition, the Court views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brigham Young University v.
Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678, 683 (Utah 2005); Alta v. Holden, 44 P.3d
781, 787 (Utah 2002); Ward v. Intermountain Farmer's Ass 'n, 907 P.2d 264, 266
(Utah 1995). Enforceability of such Releases is a question of law. Russ v.
Woodside Homes, 905 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1985).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW
The issue was preserved before the District Court in Snowbird's Motion for
Summary Judgment. (R. at 170-249, 290-323, 383-399, 413 and 417-418.)

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
In Russ v. Woodside Homes, 905 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1985), the Utah
Court of Appeals discussed the enforceability of such Releases, but not in a
recreational/adhesion contract context. Neither did the Utah Court of Appeals in
Russ consider what effect the Utah Inherent Risk of Skiing Act and the public
policy it espouses would have upon the enforceability of such Releases. Other
states, however, with similar Inherent Risk of Skiing statutes, and which promote
their ski industry in much the same fashion as Utah (i.e. Vermont and Colorado),
have found such Releases to be void as against public policy.
Rothstein submits that the Utah Inherent Risk of Skiing Statute produces the
same result. And that Statute reads as follows:
The Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is practiced by a large
number of residents of Utah and attracts a large number of
nonresidents, significantly contributing to the economy of this state.
It further finds that few insurance carriers are willing to provide
liability insurance protection to ski area operators and that the
premiums charged by those carriers have risen sharply in recent
years due to confusion as to whether a skier assumes the risks
inherent in the sport or skiing. It is the purpose of this act, therefore,
to clarify the law in relation to skiing injuries and the risks inherent
in that sport, to establish as a matter of law that certain risks are
inherent in that sport, and to provide that, as a matter of public
policy, no person engaged in that sport shall recover from a ski
operator for injuries resulting from those inherent risks.
§78-27-51.
As used in this act:
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(1)
"Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or conditions
which are an integral part of the sports of skiing, snowboarding, and
ski jumping, including, but not limited to: changing weather
conditions, variation or steepness in terrain; snow or ice conditions;
surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest growth,
rocks, stumps, impact with lift towers and other skiers, and a skier's
failure to ski or jump within the skier's own ability.
(2)
loss.

"Injury" means any personal injury or property damage or

(3)
"Skier" means any person present in a ski area for the purpose
of engaging in the sport of skiing, nordic, freestyle, or other types of
ski jumping; and snowboarding.
(4)
"Ski area" means any area designated by a ski area operator
to be used for skiing, nordic, freestyle, or other type of ski jumping,
and snowboarding.
(5)
"Ski area operator" means those persons, and their agents,
officers, employees or representatives, who operate a ski area.
§ 78-27-52.
Notwithstanding anything in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43 to
the contrary, no skier may make any claim against, or recover from,
any ski area operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent
risks of skiing.
§ 78-27-53.
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent
locations within each ski area which shall include a list of the
inherent risks of skiing, and the limitations on liability of ski area
operators, as defined in this act.
§ 78-27-54.

4

STATEMENT OF CASE
This case arose out of a serious skiing accident that occurred on February 3,
2003 when Rothstein struck a snow covered manmade retaining wall that was on
one of Snowbird's ski runs. The retaining wall was unmarked. Rothstein was a
season pass holder at Snowbird. Snowbird and all of the other Salt Lake County
ski resorts require season pass holders to sign exculpatory agreements releasing
the resorts for injuries incurred by skiers as a result of the resorts' negligence.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Rothstein sued Snowbird on two claims of negligence. (R. at 109.)
Snowbird moved for summary judgment based upon the exculpatory agreements
Rothstein had signed. (R. at 172-194.) On January 23, 2006, the District Court
granted Snowbird's Motion dismissing Rothstein's negligence claims with
prejudice. (R. at 413, 417-418.) The District Court also granted Rothstein's
Motion to File an Amended Complaint asserting a claim for gross negligence. (R.
at 413, 415.) Rothstein thereafter filed his Amended Complaint {R. at 419) and a
Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
41 (a)(1.) (R. at 426.) On February 16, 2006, Rothstein filed his Notice of
Appeal. (R. at 428.)

2

A copy of that Order is included in the Addendum to this Brief as Exhibit A.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rothstein was seriously injured on February 3, 2003 while skiing the Fluffy
Bunny Run at the Snowbird Ski Resort. (R. at 50, 53 and 55 ) Rothstein was
injured when he collided with a retaining wall constructed of mine cribbing that
had been erected across the ski run. (R. at 59.) The resulting impact left
Rothstein with 12 broken ribs, the loss of a kidney, a bruised heart, damaged liver
and a collapsed lung. (R. at 53.)
Rothstein testified that the retaining wall was not visible as he skiied down
upon it. (R. at 59 and 60.) More importantly, Rothstein's testimony is confirmed
by the photograph which Snowbird personnel took of Rothstein and the accident
scene immediately afterwards. (R. at 57.) In the record at page 46, is a
photograph of ski patrolmen working on the injured Rothstein. On this
photograph, Rothstein drew an arrow showing the approximate route he skied on
the Fluffy Bunny Run, Taken above the accident scene and looking down on the
ski run, the retaining wall is completely snow covered and not visible in this
photograph. (R. at 60.)
In the record at page 47, is another photograph of the same ski patrolmen
providing medical care to Rothstein. This photograph is taken from below the
retaining wall and shows the retaining with which Rothstein collided. (R. at 5152.) Copies of the foregoing photographs are included in the Addendum to this
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Brief as Exhibits B and C, respectively. Other photographs of the retaining wall
and a DVD of the massive structure taken during the summer following
Rothstein's accident appear in the record at pages 202, 203 and 390-91. One of
these photographs of the retaining wall is also included in the Addendum as
Exhibit D.
Dean Cardinale is Director of Snow Safety at Snowbird. (R. at 60.)
Following the accident, Cardinale visited Rothstein while Rothstein was being
hospitalized for his injuries. In that visit, Cardinale told Rothstein that the
retaining wall should have been "marked," that it was hazardous and, more
importantly, that the accident was Snowbird's fault. (R. at 42.) Bradley Sachs is a
friend of Rothstein's. Sachs is also an attorney. Sachs likewise spoke with
Cardinale about Rothstein's accident and Cardinale told Sachs that the retaining
wall should have been marked. (R. at 57.)
Rothstein is an expert skier. Consequently, during a deposition,
Snowbird's counsel asked Rothstein what should have been done to make that
Fluffy Bunny Run safe, Rothstein gave the following answer:
I think this area should have been completely fenced off until the
snowpack was such that the object was completely covered and it
was safe to ski over.
(R. at 54.)

Pete Schory is the Head of Ski Patrol. Schory said that the Fluffy Bunny
Run had been open since 1971. (R. at 51.) Schory also said that the retaining
wall was constructed by Snowbird in the summer of 1983. (R. at 89.)
In response to Interrogatories, Snowbird admitted that it has never sold,
given or provided a season's pass to anyone without requiring the signing of a
Release Agreement. (R. at 393.) In response to the same Interrogatories,
Snowbird further admitted that the retaining wall was constructed on land owned
by the Untied States Forest Service. (Id.) In its Memorandum in Opposition to
Rothstein's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Snowbird admitted that all the
other Salt Lake County Utah ski resorts (i.e. Alta, Brighton and Solitude) require
similar Release and Indemnity Agreements from season pass holders. (R. at 327.)
In order to obtain a Seven Summits Pass, Rothstein was required to sign
two Release and Indemnity Agreements. (R. at 185 and 191.) The first agreement
provided as follows:
I am aware that "skiing, in its various forms" is a hazardous sport
involving the risks of injuries and death. In consideration for my use
of Alta or Snowbird ski areas, I hereby waive all my claims,
including claims of personal injury, death and property damage
against Alta or Snowbird, their agents and employees. I agree to
assume all risks of personal injury, death and/or property damage
associated with skiing, snowboarding and/or operating or resulting
from the fault of Alta, Snowbird, their agents or employees. I agree
to hold harmless and indemnify Alta and Snowbird, their agents
and employees, from all my claims, including those caused by
negligence or other fault of Alta or Snowbird, their agents or
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employees. I agree that am ; »
•<• in.. * <»: nn ^jn^senidiixc^
initiate against Alta or Siv^ '
ir agents or employees, should
be brought exclusively in
^ County. Utah, and that the laws
of the State of Utah shall go\ cm.
(R. at 185) (emphasis in original).
I hi" siui'iitl Riii'iist miiljiiiul til'1 h>ll»^M'in Liiit'iKifJt,
- nucb\ acknowledge that (he use ol {he ioeku loom luunge. *ki
mountain and any privilege nr sen ice incident iu m\ membership '"
Seven Summits Club is taken w iih knowledge of the risks ol
possible injury. 1 am aware thai skiing and snowboarding in then
various forms ("Skiing") are hazardous sports involving the risks of
injuries and death. In consideration of my use of the Snowbird
Corporation ("Snowbird") ski facility, 1 agree to assume and accept
all risk of injury to myself and my guests, including the inherent risk
of skiing, the risks associated with the operation of the ski area and
the risk caused by the negligence of Snowbird, its employees or
agents \ release and agree to indemnify Snowbird, all landowners
of the ski area, and employees and agents from all claims for injuries
or damages arising out of the operation of the ski area or my
activities at Snowbird, whether such injuries or damages arise out o.
the risk of skiing or from any other cause, including the negligence
of Snowbird, its employees and agents. I agree never n- tie
Snowbird, its employees or agents on am claim arising mit nf the
operation of the ski area or my activities at Snowbird. 1 itis
agreement is hindinp on rm heir: *md assien^.
(R. at 19 h (rmrhasis in original).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is impoi tantto note that those States (such as Coloi ado and V ei moi it)
w 1 lich promote tl leii ski ii ldustry consider skiing at ski resorts as providing an
essential public service. It is also important to note that Colorado and Vermont,
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like Utah both have an Inherent Risk of Skiing Act. In Colorado and Vermont,
such Releases are not enforceable as a matter of law because they are ambiguous
as to what hazards are included and they violate public policy. The Colorado and
Vermont Courts noted that their respective Inherent Risks of Skiing Statutes
determine both the scope of the ski resort's immunity from suit and its
responsibility to patrons. Hence, Releases for future injuries violated that public
policy and are, therefore, unenforceable. The same would be true for the Releases
at issue in the instant case pursuant to the Utah Inherent Risk of Skiing Act
STATES WITH A STRONG PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE SKI INDUSTRY
CONSIDER SIMILAR RELEASE AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS TO
BE VOID ON THE BASIS OF PUBLIC POLICY.
In making a decision as to the legality of the exculpatory agreements
between Rothstein and Snowbird, this Court must consider (1) whether the
agreements are clear and understandable in expressing the intentions of the parties
and (2) whether the agreements violate public policy. The existence of either one
of the foregoing elements is sufficient to make a Release for future negligence
unenforceable or void and both exist in this instance.
A.

Clear Expression of Intent. The United States District Court for the

District of Utah has stated Utah law to be "exculpatory agreements are binding so
long as they are clear and unequivocal in expressing the parties' agreement to
absolve the defendant of liability." Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., Ltd., 839
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F Supp. 789, ; 93 (I) ! II \ il 1 1/993) I lowever, whether il : ^.. ;.; uuset

speak m tcniio ui injuries J I damages arising from "risk of skiing."" the risk
associated with the operation ol a >.ki j i u . and the general "risk caused b> the
negligence ol ^i">"hnil

I b< 'IV/C<MV*> \n\ nnllMiiy ilmnl iln \ "i4i posed h\ a

snow-covered man-made retaining wall constructed on a ski run.
The United States District Court for T Jtah has also held that "assumption of
risk
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such a risk w as not clearly stated in the Releases.
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The Releases Violate Public Policy. I he I Jtah Supreme Court has

adopted ,i \! unlaid I'm iletn'iiiiiimi' P lirllii i llieir i>, a > lioii).', public inh h si in

the provision of ski services. But there is a standard that has been adopted by
other states in evaluating public interest See Tunklv Regents of University of
< alijontia^

4K \ V J"d 44 I I 14(1 \t 1% 11 lunkl Imlils llial • iRi : iea si ?ft:>r fi il i n e

Iiniji ii y Is iixv alid if it show s some or all of the following:

ii

[1]

It concerns a business of a type generally thought
suitable for public regulation.

[2]

The parties seeking exculpation is forming a service of
great importance to the public, which is often a matter
of practical necessity for some members of the public.

[3]

The party hold itself out as willing to perform this
service for any member of the public who seeks it, or
at least for any member coming within certain
established standards.

[4]

As a result of the essential nature of the service, and
the economic setting of the transaction, the party
invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage
of bargaining strength against any member of the
public who seeks [the party's] service.

[5]

In exercising its superior bargaining power, the party
confronts the public with a standardized adhesion
contract of exculpation and makes no provision
whereby the purchaser may pay additional reasonable
fees and obtain protection against negligence.

[6]

Finally, a result of the transaction, the personal
property of the purchaser is placed under the control of
the seller subject to the risk of carelessness by the
seller [the seller's agents].

Id. at 445-446 (footnotes omitted). Rothstein submits that all six of the foregoing
elements to invalidate the Releases exist in this instance.
To begin with, the ski industry is suitable for public regulation as is
evidence by the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act which specifically provides:
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I lie Legislature hnJ..

.

• 'mg i> piaeineu n; i ^,vi <.

number of residents oi . ^ aiid attracts a large number oi
nonresidents sjonifn nniK . ontributing to the economy of the state.
Utah Code Ann. § 78~27~" I

That finding \\^\\V% me< • 'he first three elements of

the Tunkl test
' I lie foil u 1:1: i ai id fiftl i elei i lents of tl le 7 wn&/test ai e clearl} met b> the fact
that all local ski areas apparently impose a similar liability provision as a condition
fur season's pasv,> Finally, with respect to the unmarked snow-covered relamm?
AV.. ._ KoiiL^u

i s i. \> ei e c leai 1;> si lbject to Sno ' ": > bh d' s conti • :)1

Many states have enacted a statute similar to "Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing
4rL The Vermont equi\ aieui of Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act provides as
follows:
Nu'iwiUiNidnaihL. Lue puAi:>ioih oi section io w» ol this title, a person -*ho
lakes pari in an\ sport accepts as a matter of law the dangers that inlieie
therein insofar as they are obvious and neccssat \.
12 V.S.A §1037 (1978). Based upon thai /h /, lU, supreme Court, of Vermont has

releasing defendants from all liability resulting from negligence are \ nit?
eontran to public policv " Dahrrvv SKI

fv 7 *™

A

.2d 795,

seriously injured when he collided with a metal pole that formed part of the
control maze for a ski lift line. Before ihe ski season started, Dalury purchased a
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season pass and signed a form releasing the ski area from all liability. The
Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that the
exculpatory agreements, which released defendants from all liability, were valid.
The Supreme Court of Vermont explicitly overruled the Superior Court, stating
that the exculpatory agreements were void as contrary to public policy.
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court of Vermont rejected
defendants' argument that ski resorts do not provide an essential public service.
The Court reasoned, "the defendants' area is a facility open to the public. They
advertise and invite skiers and nonskiers of every level of skiing ability to their
premises for the price of a ticket." Id. at 799. "Each ticket sale may be, for some
purposes, a purely private transaction. But when a substantial number of such
sales take place as a result of the seller's general invitation to the public to utilize
the facilities and services in question, a legitimate public interest arises." Id. The
Court held that the defendant ski resort was in a better position to guard and insure
against risks. The Court stated that
[t]he policy rationale is to place responsibility for maintenance of the land
on those who own or control it, with the ultimate goal of keeping accidents
to the minimum level possible. Defendants, not recreational skiers, have
the expertise and opportunity to foresee and control hazards, and to guard
against the negligence of their agents and employees. They alone can
properly maintain and inspect their premises, and train their employees in
risk management. They alone can insure against risks and effectively
spread the cost of insurance among their thousands of customers. Skiers,
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Finally,, the Court rejected defendants' argument that the public policy of
;il :i
the state, as expressed In tl l e ""
", it x 'eptanc 't " of J nhe rei it Ri sks ' stati ite,, 1 2 V S V.

§103"

.

•. •

willingness on the part of the Legislature to limit ski area

liability. The defendants argued that public polie\ favors the use of express
releases such as the one signer i-* r uunhi;
I'mUiit^ '\iefei

. ;

-r

\u uourt rejv,\^w .;us argument
*M.I ?

- ivuv" -K^V-

r -v with

the statute. The statute places responsibilit) lor the inherent risks' oI an\ ii-^non
the part.icipa.nt, insofar as si ich risks are obvious and necessary." ' 1 < / at 800

risk nui an obvious and necessary one in the sport of skiing. 1 hu^ a okiei \>
assumption * THK, inherent risks of skiing does no( abrogate the ski area's dntv ' v
warn, of or correct dangers which in the exercise of reasonable pi udence in the
cii ci imsta nces coi lid have been foreseen and corrected."" Id. (citations omitted).
I\ 1uch like Utah's Inherent Risk of 'Skiing statute, the Vermont statute
protects ski resorts from llabil.it> based, on the inherent risk,. ,.; .hnng, but does nol
go so far as to protect them from tl leir ow n negligei ice 1 1 le Vermont coi ti ts
refused to allow the ski resorts "to undermine the public policy underlying
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business invitee law and allow skiers to bear risks they have no ability or right to
control." Id. at 799. The same should be true for Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing
statute. Since, like the Vermont Legislature, the Utah legislature has clearly
allocated the duties of skiers and ski area operators. In the floor debates on Utah's
Inherent Risk of Skiing Act, Senate Bill 146, the sponsor of that bill, Senator
Finlinson, expressly stated the purpose of this bill was to reduce the liability of ski
area operators and regulate the relationship between skiers and ski area operators.
Senator Finlinson said, "this kind of law does not prohibit the individual from
being successful or successfully bringing a claim against the operator if the
operator was, in fact, negligent.. ." Senator Finlinson went on to say that this law
imposed upon ski resorts the responsibility to operate in "a non-negligent
manner." Afternoon Session of the Utah State Senate General Session of 1979,
Day 40, February 16, 1979, Audograph Disc 184 & 185, Track 2 at 4 minutes.
The legislative history of the floor debates continued and Senator Finlinson
explained that, "the main thrust of Senate Bill 146 is to clarify the Utah law so that
the skier assumes the responsibility for the inherent risks of skiing. The ski areas
still have the responsibility for making sure ... they don't operate in a negligent
manner." Morning Session of the Utah State Senate General Session of 1979, Day
43, February 19, 1979, Audograph Disc 186 & 187, Track 6 at 3 minutes 50
seconds. Given this express intent on the part of the Utah Legislature to allocate
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responsibility for the operation of ski areas, it would violate p, . . .
ski area opei atoi s to " * • a/h - e their responsibilities 1 11 iile i this stati ite by a separate
private release.
Colorado's equivalent of the I Jtah Inherent Risk of Skiing statute reads as

t in. general assenihK herebx finds and declares thai it is in the mleic-, oi
the stale oft 'ulorad* to establish reasonable safet) standards for ihc
operation of ski areas and lot the skiers using iheni. Realizing the dangers
that inhere in the sport of skiing, regardless 01 an> and all reasonable .afetv
^p^snres which can be employed, the purpose of this article is to
supplement the passenger tramwav safety provisions of pari 7 of art n
title 25, C.R.S.: to further define the legal responsibilities of ski area
operators and their agents and employees: to define the responsibility > of
skiers using such ski areas: and ?-. define die :^ghi-- :r-d h jhilities existing
K l n n j i die skier and the ski aiea operator and between skiers
C .R .S., L §33. 1 1 • 2
As used in this article, unless 'the context otherwise requires:
(3.5) "Inherent dangers and risks of skiing" means those dangers or
conditions that are part of the sport of skiing, including changing weather
conditions; snow conditions as they exist or may change, such as ice, hard
pack, powder, packed powder, wind pack, corn, crust, slush, cut-up snow,
and machine-made snow: surface or subsurface conditions such as haie
spots, forest urown roeks, slumps, streambeds. ehiK extreme lerraih and
trees. - >iher natural objects, and collisions with ^u », \) nural objeU
•••." \* nli ! U towers, signs, posts, fences or enclosures. Imtrants. water
pipes, or other man-made structures and their components: \ anatiosv ••->
steepness or terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope design,
snowmaking or grooming operations, including but not limited to roads,
freestvle terrain, jumps, and catwalks or other terrain modifications;
collision*- w nh other skiers: and :he failure of skiers to ski within their own
abilities ' in- ten- * nhcrent dangers and risks of skiing" does not include
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the negligence of a ski area operator as set forth in section 33-44-104(2).
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the liability of the ski area
operator for injury caused by the use or operation of ski lifts.
C.R.S.A. § 33-44-103. In Phillips v. Monarch Recreation Corp., 668 P.2d 982
(Colo. App. 1983), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that a private agreement
could not modify the Colorado Ski Safety Act's express allocation of the duties of
skiers and ski area operators. 668 P.2d 982.
The Colorado Court held that the operator's failure to warn the plaintiff of
heavy equipment on the slope was negligence under the statute and that, based on
the public policy announced by the legislature, liability for negligence based on a
violation of the express terms of the statute could not be waived by a private
agreement. The Court held, "[statutory provisions may not be modified by
private agreement if doing so would violate the public policy expressed in the
statute. The statutes at issue here allocate the parties' respective duties with regard
to safety of those around them, and the trial court correctly excluded a purported
agreement intended to alter those duties." Id. at 987.
Again, similar to Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act, Colorado has a statute
that clearly allocates the duties of skiers and ski area operators. The Colorado
legislature, like the Utah legislature, intended that skiers would assume risks
inherent in the sport of skiing, but did not intend to preclude skiers from bringing
an action based on the ski area operator's negligence. The Colorado Court of
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\ ppeals was not willing to uphold a pi ivate agreement intended to a U i ;f iese
e: ;:pi: ess stati itoi ;; > di ities. ai id tl lis Cc i n I: silj illlj :| "l » *i ,:*| 11 1 Ihi "!|
iii Hanks v. Powder Ridge, 888 A.2d JJO v t o m i . 2uU^) 9 the Connecticut
Supreme Court: w as guided by the Tunkl factors and found that an exculpatory
agreement signed by snowtubing patron, . K M -

r

personal inji iries iriei irred as a result of their own neo licence was invalid as against
puhlit no lie;

* he Court stated "[t]he law docs nut l.^'»r - * -r.inu l provision*

wind* rchcve a person fi,-^. .»> , own negligence
" I his is becai lse e

•.

"

..

^..a.^-r^ om:;: . t„
•• -j Wat*.."

governing our tort system/ Id. 1 h e Court reasoned liiat [I.IIC concern^
expressed by the court in Dalury are equally applicable to "the context of
iiiunliibifig, ..Hid we agiee ili.il il r illogical lo pciim! >IHM lube is. and ihc |iubhr
generally, to bear the costs of risks that they hav e no ability or right to control."
Id. at 745, The Coi irt concluded that the agreement at Ksm in Hanks violated
pi lblicpolicy, not solely because ol the volume ol public p.iMh, ipali«»u„ (nil because
.• ^ i.u!- 1

- ! d* -- •'i - '

-'defendants invite the public generally to

their lacility; defendants, not recreational snowtubers, have the knowledge,
experience and authority to maintain the snowtubing runs in reasonably safe
i iiiidiliwn iiitJ t d.ihi! ii(i?jiri-J (hi ncyligeme of it i m|ilii>\v, tlii d< hndanfs I U T C
in a better position to insure against the risk of their negligence and to spread the

costs of insurance to their patrons; that if they upheld the agreement, defendants
would be permitted to obtain broad waivers of their liability and the incentive for
them to maintain a reasonably safe snowtubing environment would be removed,
with the public bearing the cost; and the fact that the defendants had superior
bargaining power. All of these factors that the Connecticut Supreme Court used to
determine that the agreement at issue in Hanks violated public policy are present
in this case and this Court should hold also that the Releases at issue violate public
policy.
In an analogous case, the New Mexico Court applied these six standards of
Tunkl to an exculpatory release agreement and found it to be unenforceable as a
matter of policy. See Berlangier v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098 (N.M. 2003).
Berlangier was a case in which the defendant operated a recreational resort in
New Mexico which offered recreational activities such as fishing, horseback
riding, hiking, etc. As a requirement for participating in the resort's activities,
such as horseback riding, guests were required to sign a release. Plaintiff was
seriously injured while horseback riding. The issue before the New Mexico
Supreme Court was whether the release violated public policy so as not to be
enforceable and the Berlangier court concluded that it did. The Berlangier court
noted that public policy disallowing a release can be furnished either through
statutory common law. A turning point on public policy in the Berlangier case

was the New Mexico's "Equine Liability Act, N.M.S.A. 1978 § 42-13-4 (1993)."
This law, which is similar to the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act in Utah, provided in
pertinent part as follows:
A.
No person, corporation or partnership is liable for personal injuries
to or for the death of a rider that may occur as a result of the behavior of
equine animals while engaged in any equine activities.
B.
No person, corporation or partnership shall make any claim against,
maintain any action against or recover from a rider, operator, owner, trainer
or promoter for injury, loss or damage resulting from equine behavior
unless the acts or omissions of the rider, owner, operator, trainer or
promoter constitute negligence.
C.
Nothing in the Equine Liability Act shall be construed to prevent or
limit the liability of the operator, owner, trainer or promoter of an equine
activity who:
(1)
provided the equipment or tack, and knew or should have
known that the equipment or tack was faulty and an injury was the
proximate result of the faulty condition of the equipment or tack;
(2)
provided the equine and failed to make reasonable and
prudent efforts to determine the ability of the rider to:
(a) engage safely in the equine activity; or
(b) safely manage the particular equine based on the rider's
representations of his ability;
(3)
owns, leases, rents or otherwise is in lawful possession and
control of the land or facilities upon which a rider sustained injuries
because of a dangerous condition that was known to the operator,
owner, trainer or promoter of the equine activity;

(4)
committed an act or omission that constitutes conscious or
reckless disregard for the safety of a rider and an injury was the
proximate result of that act or omission; or
(5)

intentionally injures a rider.

N.M.S.A. 1978 § 42-13-4 (1993). Simply put, the New Mexico Equine Liability
Act precluded anyone injured while horseback riding from suing for injuries was
attributable to the behavior of the horse, but did allow injured persons to sue
equine operators on other grounds, including their negligence involving those risks
not inherent to horseback riding. The New Mexico Supreme Court reasoned that
this Statute expressed a public policy that equine operators should be accountable
for their own negligence when the injury did not involve the behavior of the
animal. (Id. at p. 111.) The Court noted that this public policy existed because it
expressed what activities the equine operator would be liable for and those for
which he/she/it would not be liable. The same is true for the Utah Inherent Risk of
Skiing Act.
The existence of risk allocating loss such as Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing
Act are very important because appellate courts consistently hold that such laws
apportioning responsibility for injuries between resort operators and patrons
constitute public policy that overrides Release and Indemnity Agreements.
Finally, within the context of the Colorado recreational skiing industry, the
Tenth Circuit has stated that these Release and Indemnity Agreements are adhesion

contracts. See Rosen v. LTV Recreational Dev., Inc., 569 F.2d 1117, 1123 (10
Cir. 1978). And that is another reason for not enforcing the Releases at issue in
the instant case since every ski resort in Salt Lake County requires patrons to
execute such an agreement in order to obtain a season pass.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse or vacate the District Court's summary judgment
and instruct the District Court to submit the case to a jury for further findings at a
trial in this matter.
DATED this

of June, 2006.
SUITTERAXLAND

sse C. Trentadue
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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EXHIBIT A

FILEO OlSTiiCT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN 2 3 2006
SALTIAKF r n i i M T Y
By

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Deputy Clerk

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY

WILLIAM ROTHSTEIN, an individual,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.

SNOWBIRD CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant.

Civil No. 040925852
Judge Anthony Qumn

On December 13, 2005, this Court heard oral argument on (1) defendant Snowbird's
Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re:
defendant's Eighth Affirmative Defense; (3) plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Request ("Motion") for
(Continuance; and (4) plaintiffs Motion to Amend. A separate Order will be entered concerning
plaintiffs Motion to Amend as directed by this Court.
Although fully briefed, the Court determined that it was unnecessary at this time to rule
(in plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re: the Inherent Risk of Slamg Act
Affirmative Defense..

Exhibit A

Jesse Trentadue, Esq. of Suitrer Axland appeared on behalf of plaintiff Rothstem.
Gordon Strachan, Esq. and Kevin J Simon, Esq. of Strachan & Strachan, P.C., appeared on
behalf of defendant Snowbird.
WHEREFORE, after reviewing the court papers submitted by plaintiff Rothstem and
defendant Snowbird and hearing the arguments presented at the December 13,2005 Hearings this
Court hereby ORDERS, DECREES, and ADJUDGES as follows:
1.

Defendant Snowbird's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding plaintiffs

ordinary negligence claim is GRANTED and plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment regarding defendant's Eighth Affirmative Defense is DENIED Plaintiffs ordinary
negligence claim is, thus, dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Request (or "Motion") for Continuance is DENIED.
DATED t h i s ^ d a y of

Ujlf^-^

BY ORDER OF THIS COURT:

The Honorable Antllony Quinn
Third Judicial District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:
STRACHAN & STRACHAN

Kevin J. Simon
Attorneys for defendant Snowbird
SUITTER AXLAND

Sse Trentadue
(Attorneys for plaintiff Rothstem
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EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT C

OZOO 3AVS

EXHIBIT D

